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Work/family balance (WFB) debates and policies in France appear in a paradoxical 
context. In this country where the fertility rate is the highest in Europe (2 children per 
woman in 2006), where almost 60% of the women between 15 and 64 are on the labour 
market, mainly in full-time jobs, where childcare services and pre-schools offer a large 
panel of formal childcare arrangements, the level of stress and pressure that parents are 
facing in terms of WFB is still very high, as stated by a recent comparative research 
conducted by Rosemary Crompton (2006). To explain this paradox of the negative 
WFB in the French context, Crompton insists on the following factor: the very unequal 
division of domestic and caring tasks between genders, what she called “gender 
traditionalism”. “Despite a long history of state support for working mothers and family 
directed benefits, both gender stereotyping in respect of employment, and the domestic 
division of labour, are more conventional (or traditional) in France than might be 
expected” (Crompton, 2006, p. 132). Hélène Périvier defends a similar argument when 
she considers that it exists in France “un statu quo inégalitaire”1. 
This hypothesis of a French traditionalism or conservatism, as far as family and 
family policies are concerned, needs probably to be demonstrated. For example, it is 
difficult to assess what could be the main source of this negative WFB, stress and 
tensions in French households, analysed by R. Crompton. Is the French conservatism 
the main factor? Why don’t we consider the impact of the labour market transformation, 
which may explain this strong tension between work and family life? As a matter of 
fact, these tensions, stress and pressure that parents are facing in their daily life may 
have much to do with a global degradation of the labour market.  
                                                 
1
 . Considering that the French parental leave is used by women in 98% of the cases, Hélène Périvier 
considers: “The unequal statu quo is considered as the result of a ‘free choice’ of women who stops 
momentarily or definitely their activity or reduces their working time. The ‘free choice’ paradigm is not 
credible. And if the unequal situation which persists on the labour market was the result of a 
discrimination against women” (Périvier, 2007, p. 76). 
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Degradation of the labour market: a source of considerable 
tensions in households 
As Pierre Concialdi recently stated: “From the beginning of the 80s, the temporary 
employments or part-time jobs increased drastically: 5 times more temp jobs, 4 times 
more fixed term contracts (‘Contrat à durée déterminée’), 3 times more training 
(‘stages’) or ‘emplois aidés’ (‘protected’ jobs), and more than the double of people 
concerned by underemployment. In all, the number of precarious employments 
increased by 2,5 millions between 1983 and 2005, which represent more than 60% of 
the new salaried jobs on the period (4 millions)” (Concialdi, 2006, p. 20). If we consider 
the situation in 2003, precarious jobs concern as a all about 4 millions people: 1,118,000 
underemployed on part-time jobs; 473,000 in temporary jobs; 268,000 apprentices; 
1,604,000 on fixed term contracts; 506,000 trainees and on “protected jobs” (‘emplois 
aidés’). This population represents 16% of the people on the labour market. And if we 
add to this precarious group, the unemployed (2,656,000 people at that time, which 
represent about 10% of the active population), the “précariat”2 (Castel, 2006) concerns 
6,6 millions people (see also Castel et al, 1997). And the picture is still much more 
negative, if we go beyond the BIT definition of unemployment (which is very 
restricted), and accept to take into consideration the “discouradged” unemployed people 
(760,000 people in which 56% of women in 2001) or the “unavailable” unemployed, 
who can’t take immediately a job mainly because of caring responsibilities (220,000, in 
which 67% of women) or the unemployed who were working more than one hour 
during the previous week of the employment inquiry which means that they are 
excluded of the statistics (994,000 people in which 60% of women) (Maruani, 2006)
3
.  
In this global trend of degradation of the labour market, the more vulnerable are more 
concerned: young people, women and of course, lone mothers who cumulate the 
difficulties.  
Florence Jany-Catrice explains also that the major part of the new jobs created during 
the 90’s is non-qualified (more 6% per year between 1994 and 2002). In 2003, these 
jobs represented 5,3 millions of employments, knowing that 80% of them were 
occupied by women, in which half were working part-time, mainly non-desired part-
                                                 
2
 . “We can call ‘précariat’ this condition under which precariousness becomes a proper level of the 
organisation of labour” (Castel, 2006, p 422). 
3
 . “Number of women are escaping from any registration of unemployment, because they are 
‘naturally’ trapped in the specific female and socially invisible form of privation of employment: 
housewives, erased figure of the thinking about unemployment’ (Maruani, 2006, p. 409). 
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time. 40% of these jobs were paid less than half of the median salary. These employees 
have also the more constraining conditions of work, mostly incompatible with family 
and parental responsibilities (fragmented hours of work, work late in the evenings or 
very early in the mornings, week-ends, etc.). 
Taking these elements into account, it is certainly difficult to say that the main factor 
to explain a difficult WFB in France could be the “traditionalism” or the familialist 
option of the French decision makers and citizens. Nevertheless, this degradation of the 
labour market may go hand in hand with a certain form of resistance of the French 
debate to face this new context.  
The French familialism may have three main expressions: 
- first, a familialist attitude of the population, as a cultural model (Pfau-Effinger, 
2006) 
- second, a familialist impact of the measures and policies that have been recently 
adopted and implemented 
- last, a familialist rhetoric at the political level, in their main ideas and arguments 
concerning family issues.  
Even if it is out of the scope of this paper to prove the persistence of this familialist 
option, we would like to develop some arguments on the basis of two main types of 
material: the French childcare policy measures and their impact during the past five 
years, on one side, and the main arguments and ideas developed in the political debate, 
either by politicians at the occasion of the Presidential campaign or in some recent 
official reports. 
 
 
French family policy: a long incrementalist tradition coming from 
a familialist / natalist root 
French family policy is generally considered as one of the most explicit and intensive 
one in Europe. It is even stated that the « family issue » could be the basis of the 
French social security system, just as poverty was a cornerstone of the Anglo-Saxon 
Welfare State and workers’ status that of Germany’s Sozial Staat (Merrien, 1990). 
Family benefits have even been considered as an extension of the salary towards 
households and, in a way, as one of the main pillars of the French social welfare 
system (Friot, 1998). Childhood has been considered quite early in France as a 
“common good” and a source of human capital, mainly because of the demographic 
challenge that this country was facing at the beginning of the 20
th
 century. The low 
level of fertility during the 19
th
 century and the trauma of the 1
st
 World War explain 
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strong pro-natalism in France
4
. All the conditions were satisfied at the beginning of 
the 20
th
 century to promote family and fertility as public concerns: First of all, a 
strong public debate, confronting different traditions of thinking (familialism, 
natalism and hygienism, libertarian movements); second, a public issue: this 
demographic challenge; third, social movements to promote family institution and 
fertility (recognized as social partners by the State with the Loi Gounot in 1942), and 
fourth, some experimentation in French public family policy (family premium in 
patriarchal industries and for civil servants at the end of the 19
th
 century; institution 
of mutual aid funds: “les caisses de compensation”). These different elements make 
possible the “décrets-lois” of 1938 and 1939, institutionalising French family policy 
as pro-natalist policy. Even the period of Vichy government didn’t affect 
fundamentally this basic pro-natalist policy, despite the strengthening of a familist 
ideology. The French Social security Act in 1946 finalized this institutionalization 
process, by creating a “family branch” of our Bismarckian Welfare State.  Then, 
family policy goals moved clearly from the end of the Third Republic (Code de la 
famille de 1939) until the 80s, from a natalist perspective, towards a distributive 
(universal and horizontal) and then redistributive (selective and vertical) perspective. 
Looking backwards, it is tempting to consider clear breaks in this story. To simplify, 
we could distinguish four main periods: 
 . 1945-1965: the French family policy “Golden Age”, with strong incentives to 
promote fertility and compensate the cost of children. This is the time of a universal 
and intense family policy, which represented in the mid-50s more than half of social 
security expenditures; 
 . 1965-1975: the “women’s rights” revolution, with a lot of fundamental reforms of 
Civil Law concerning marriage (“réforme des régimes matrimoniaux” in 1965), 
parental rights (autorité parentale) (1970), filiation (1972), divorce (1975), sexuality 
(1975, abortion); 
 . 1975-1985: Equity issue, with the “rediscovery of poverty in a rich country” as 
Lionel Stoléru (1977) stated, and the development of the means-testing in family 
allowances. 
 . 1985-2000: regulating unemployment and facilitating conciliation between work 
and family responsibilities with childcare policy measures. 
The distinction between these different periods doesn’t necessarily indicate real 
turning points, but rather a progressive reframing of family policy goals and a 
process of cumulative change. We suggest these different phases to indicate that new 
social problems were identified, new public debates were occurring, knowing at the 
same time that the previous objectives were still active when new ones were 
promoted. So it is possible to identify nowadays some family policy measures which 
tend to promote fertility, but at the same time some others which promote more 
equality between genders; others which try to reduce social and economic 
inequalities and some whose implicit objective is to regulate the labour market and to 
develop female’s employment. In that sense, change in the family policy sector is 
typically incremental. The “print of origin” doesn’t disappear and the new objectives 
are piled up on the old ones. So, it may be quite artificial to argue that we can 
identify real turning points.  
 
                                                 
4
 . In the mid-30s the number of deaths was higher than the number of lived births. 
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A Familialist cultural model about the “good childhood” and the 
“good mother” or a “no-choice” for women? 
To describe the ambiguous position of France in the comparative researches about 
Welfare, childcare, family policy, etc, we could consider France as the more Nordic 
southern country. The importance of the formal childcare offer (with the central role of 
pre-schools where almost 100% of the children between 3 and 6 years old are cared for 
and almost 35% of the 2 to 3 year olds) and the level of female employment in full-time 
jobs justify this idea. Nevertheless, the French stereotype of mothers who claimed for 
public services to develop their professional career is too simple. In fact, during a 
standard week, from Monday to Friday, 2/3 of the under 3’s are mainly cared for by 
their parents; 18% by a childminder, 8% in a crèche, 4% by grand-parents. This means 
that parents are still globally the main childcare provider (Ruault, Daniel, 2003). Even 
when both parents are working full time, they still represent the main carer for 30% of 
their under 3 children (62% of them are cared for with a paid childcare arrangement). 
For the 3-6 year olds, the main childcare solution during a normal week is of course 
school. But when they are not in school, these children are also mainly cared for by 
their parents.  
What does it mean? It is difficult to give a definitive answer to such a question. Is it a 
real choice for parents? The fact that they seem to cope with this double investment -  
work and family responsibilities- doesn’t mean that they have no needs of childcare 
alternatives. We can just discuss the following idea: In France, most part of the 
population considers that the best quality of care is guaranteed by the parents 
themselves, completed by some other professional carers. This attitude means that 
parents try to combine formal and informal resources in their care arrangements, even if 
this means many interventions (one or the other parent, grand-parents, friends, school, 
childminders, crèches, baby-sitters).  
Here, we can mention the “attitudes towards the well-being of pre-school children 
and wages work of mothers” (ISSP, 2002). In this inquiry (see Pfau-Effinger, 2006), 
France is in an intermediary position between the “traditional” countries where a 
majority of people considers that “a pre-school child is likely to suffer if his or her 
mother works” (Austria: 64,6%; Switzerland: 58,9; Poland: 56,8%; West Germany: 
55,6%; Spain: 52,2%) and the countries were this opinion concerns a minority (Sweden: 
23,7%; Denmark: 31,4%; East Germany: 32,7%; Great Britain: 38,4%). In France, 
42,4% of the people agree with this statement, showing that even if work is considered 
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as crucial for women independence (for 80% of the people), it comes in contradiction 
with the negative impact this professional insertion may have for the children. This 
contradiction may explain the tension, the stress that these women have to face when 
they want at the same time to care for their children themselves and to work on the 
labour market. Doing both means tensions, stress, running and pressure. If we add to 
this contradiction two facts - the high French level of fertility (about two children per 
women) and the gendered division of domestic and caring tasks which is still very 
unequal (they spend about two times more time for these tasks than men) -, it is possible 
to explain the difficult WFB in the French context.  
But what is the role of the family policy developed in France in the construction of 
this cultural model? Comparing the situation in the different European countries, the 
question could seem paradoxical. Indeed, if one considers the variety of childcare care 
services existing and the political measures developed in the last decade, France appears 
closer to the nordic countries than to the southern countries. And the main political 
objective seems to be that of both facilitating work/life balance (by the development of 
childcare facilities) and giving families the choice between caring and working. As from 
three years old most of the children are at school, the question is that of the 0-3 years 
old. The most important reform was the creation of the Prestation d’accueil du jeune 
enfant (PAJE) in 2004. The objective was to introduce a unique system, replacing the 
five existing allowances
5
, but also to maintain the diversity of the solutions offered, 
giving parents the choice to organise their every day work/life balance.  
The PAJE is described as a two levels’ system (Report of the Centre d’analyse 
stratégique, 2007). First, the basis, which includes a flat rate birth benefit of 840 € and a 
means tested benefit allocated each month to parents until the child is three years old. 
Second a flexible system which varies according to the type of care arrangement chosen 
by the family. It proposes three solutions: 
- An allowance to reduce the costs of childcare for parents who carry on their 
professional activity (the “complement du mode de garde” CMG). It is used to 
cover part of the wage paid to a childminder (assistante maternelle) or a person 
who cares for the children at home. It is means tested and varies according to 
the number and the age of the children.  
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 The APJE (allocation pour jeune enfant), the APE (allocation parental d’éducation, the AFEAMA 
(aide à la famille pour l’emploi d’une assistante maternelle agréée), the AGED (allocation de garde 
d’enfant à domicile), the AAD (allocation d’adoption).  
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- A parental leave (“complément du libre choix d’activité” CLCA) for parents 
who choose to care for their children. It can be paid from the first child for a 
period of six month, and from the second child until the child is 3 years old. 
- Since July 2006, a new configuration of parental leave has been created 
(“compléments optionnel du libre choix d’activité”) which enables parents to 
take a shorter leave, better paid. But this possibility only exists from the third 
child.  
Moreover, when the parental leave is used to reduce the parent’s professional 
activity, it can be combined with the allowance paying part of the cost of childcare 
(CMG).  
In practice, the PAJE reform, which includes both childcare allowances and a 
parental leave system, has introduced many inequalities and many criticisms have 
developed, showing that the parental leave existing in France is mainly taken by low 
income mothers. Indeed, the allowance is paid to parents who choose to stop or reduce 
their activity to care for their child or children. This possibility exists up to the three 
years of the child. It concerns 392 000 recipients in 2006, to which must be added the 
180 000 recipients who receive the ancient parental leave (Allocation parentale 
d’éducation, APE). 97% of these recipients are women. (Berger, Chauffaut, Olm, 
Simon, 2006).  
But, as it is flat rate (more or less half the minimum salary) and not linked to the 
level of wage of the parent, in couples, it is mostly adopted by women who usually have 
a lower income than their spouse. Moreover, it is adopted by low income mothers, for 
whom it is more economically advantageous to stop their professional activity and stay 
at home, than to cope with work/life conciliation difficulties and organise a care 
arrangement and by unemployed mothers (Fagnani, 1996). Therefore, many critics have 
arisen, accusing the French parental leave to be a poverty trap for low income and 
educated mothers (Méda, Périvier, 2007). The statistics show that the recipients 
receiving full parental leave are more often employees (Berget et alii, op. cit.).  
  
The political rhetoric: between familialism and the social 
investment strategy (tradition and modernity)  
Since the last Presidential election in 2001, the right wing obtained a large majority 
and many issues gave rise to political reinvestment and confrontation. This has been the 
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case, for example, for family issues (private life, marriage, consequences of divorce, 
parental responsibilities, homosexual parenting, etc.). This political reinvestment means 
that some traditional arguments are resurfacing, such as the necessity to promote the 
family as an institution, marriage as the normal family structure and the need to fight 
against parental irresponsibility. Political and media discourses about insecurity and 
delinquency intensified greatly during the 2002 Presidential campaign and afterwards. 
Many of these political and media discourses insisted on the culpability of some 
parents, charging that they are unable to assume their roles (Martin, 2003). 
Compared to what happened in the previous decades (1985-2001) where two main 
arguments were dominant to frame family policy reforms: “equity and the necessity to 
support the less affluent”, or “using family policy as a tool to promote employment”, 
the last five years are characterized by two dominant ideas: first, the need for the state to 
protect and promote family as a main institution; second, the necessity to invest in 
childhood, which corresponds to the European “social investment strategy” rhetoric. 
Every political actors make different combinations of these two arguments in order 
to be both modern and traditionalist.  
First argument: “Family is the basic institution of society”.  
From that perspective, the role of the government is to promote universal norms and 
to restore the family as an institution. This rhetoric relies on the fact that public opinion 
considers family as a central preoccupation. French citizens primarily expect to succeed 
in their family lives and see such success as the main condition for happiness.  
Discours du Premier ministre, Jean-Pierre Raffarin, (avril 2003): 
« La famille, c’est le lieu de la première des libertés, de l’éducation, c’est une 
communauté naturelle nécessaire, le lieu de vie où chacun peut retrouver son identité... 
Sa préservation, face aux agressions de ceux qui cherchent à asservir l’individu, est un 
devoir pour tout gouvernement ».  
At the same time, the family is also considered as the main factor in explaining social 
problems (violence, delinquency, drug abuse, etc.). The positive aspect is that defending 
and protecting the family institution is seen as a public responsibility, which means that 
the government has to define universal norms (in Civil Law), and, in particular, a 
“policy of marriage”. The negative aspect is that the government has to define a “police 
des familles” (to use the expression of Jacques Donzelot [1977]), which means that it 
has to control and punish family’s irresponsibility and deviance.  
This first position has clearly been adopted in two recent official reports:  
 9 
- the first one, published by the Conseil d’analyse économique in May 2005 by 
Michel Godet and Evelyne Sullerot (2005),  
One example of this normative attitude appears in this report about the consequences 
of divorce on children, in the following terms: “La société devrait intervenir au moins 
autant sur la conduite des familles qu’elle le fait pour la conduite automobile, car les 
blessés de la route familiale ne comptent pas moins que ceux de la route classique: ils 
supposent les mêmes politiques de prévention et de sanction que pour les chauffards… 
Les blessés de la route sociale sont d’abord des blessés de la route familiale. La 
cicatrice de la famille mal vécue se ferme d’autant moins qu’elle n’est pas reconnue.  
- the second one, published by a Parliamentary commission in January 2006 and 
titled: “Children first. 100 propositions to place child’s interest at the chore of 
family law” (Bloche & Pécresse, 2006). 
In this report, the split between left- and right-wing members of the Commission 
seems clear. Patrick Bloche, the socialist President of that commission, decided to 
express his disagreement in the foreword of the report in the following terms: “I 
don’t share either the analysis of the report about the evolution of our society, or  
the juridical consequences that it proposes… When it sets out changes, it is only to 
regret them immediately. The mission was supposed to see the society as it is, not 
as it imagines it. I am afraid that the majority of its members preferred to see it as 
they wanted it, because of their attachment to the traditional family model – a father 
and a mother linked by marriage, living together with their children – a model 
whose erosion they deplore… Marriage is presented as the only appropriate 
arrangement for a couple to be able to provide security for its children… The 
defence of children’s rights is used to maintain inequality between couples.” (op. 
cit., p. 4). 
Looking at the propositions of this report, it looks as if France was going to adopt a 
general policy defending or promoting marriage (as it has been done in the United 
States during the Georges Bush’s presidency) as the best way to support families. 
Nevertheless, as Andrew Cherlin underlined recently: “a family policy that relies too 
heavily on marriage will not help the many children destined to live in single parent and 
cohabiting-parent families – many of them economically disadvantaged – for some or 
all of their formative years. Only assistance directed to needy families, regardless of 
their household structure, will reach them” (Cherlin, 2005, p. 50). 
Second argument: to define an investment strategy as a policy of childhood.  
This argument corresponds to the “social investment strategy” promoted by the 
European Commission. The goal consists in investing in childhood and giving priority 
to prevention, to avoid producing future social problems that will overburden welfare 
policies. To invest in childhood, in this social capital, in the future workers, means to 
give priority to good childcare services, better education, good socialization, primary 
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and secondary, but also investing in health, housing and to enhance the level of income 
of households by promoting the development of bi-active couples
6
.  
This type of argument based on a social investment strategy is developed in the 
Godet and Sullerot’s official report, published in May 2005, which suggests some 
reform of family policy in order to promote fertility (Godet & Sullerot, 2005). For 
Michel Godet, the priority is to bring Europeans and, in particular, French citizens, back 
to work. He tried to demonstrate on the basis of OCDE data, that in the past 25 years, a 
gap of around one point in the annual average economic growth between Europe and 
the USA is due to the less dynamic demography of Europe. He also insists on the fact 
that France is the country whose inhabitants work least per year. According to his 
estimate, an American citizen works on average 46% more than a French citizen; a 
German citizen, 12% more; a Spanish citizen, 23% more; and a British citizen, 32% 
more.  
In the perspective of these authors, a better WFB is necessary, not only because of 
the consequences on family daily life and welfare, not only because of the negative 
impact of these tensions in terms of health, but also in strict economic terms. A negative 
WFB has a cost for the Nation:  
“Ces tensions détériorent non seulement la qualité de la vie familiale et la santé de 
ceux qui en sont victimes, mais se répercutent aussi sur le travail: retards, absentéisme, 
démobilisation, baisse de la productivité, etc. Le manque de conciliation représente 
ainsi un coût non négligeable. Certains pays, comme le Canada se sont accordés à 
analyser ce coût (Duxbury et alii, 1999). Selon cette étude, les coûts en soins de santé 
sont d’environ 6 milliards de dollars par année et le conflit travail-famille coûte aux 
entreprises canadiennes à peu près 2,7 milliards de dollars en temps perdu à cause des 
absences de travail –sans compter les coûts indirects liés par exemple au remplacement 
de l’employé, à la baisse de productivité, etc. Les politiques « family-friendly » 
attribuant une part familiale dans la responsabilité sociale des entreprises répondent en 
partie au souci de limiter ces coûts » (Godet et Sullerot, 2005, p.97) 
The “social investment strategy” reminds us of the 1930’s and of the natalist 
arguments which have dominated the French social insurance system since it has been 
                                                 
6
 Prevention has also another meaning: the detection and social control of undesirable behaviours and 
children. The last expression of this social control mode of thinking was the French controversy about a 
report published by the INSERM (Institut national de la santé et de la recherche médicale) about the 
disturbing behaviours of the 1- to 3-year old children (“les troubles de conduite”). This report, which was 
state-of-the-art with respect to the substantial (mainly American) academic literature (mainly in 
epidemiology) on the topic, summarized the main findings of research that followed cohorts of children in 
order to assess the predictability of adolescent delinquency in the behaviour of the 1-3-year-olds. On the 
basis of these conclusions, the Minister of the Interior, Nicolas Sarkozy, announced a project of a policy 
of early intervention in the nursery schools (“écoles maternelles”). Many academics and professionals 
immediately reacted against this project and different petitions are circulating at the moment. The 
popularity of the notion of parenthood in the recent public and political debate is an expression of this 
security issue in France. For a development, see Martin, 2003. 
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created. But today, this « rallying-cry » has a new European meaning. To face the 
challenge of social inequalities, Esping-Andersen (2002) is advocating a prevention 
strategy (investment in the child), rather than a curative strategy (passive adult-oriented 
social policies)
7
. Consequently, top-quality public childcare services should be 
developed on the one hand and, on the other, the employment of mothers should be 
promoted in order to insure better economic and social living conditions for their 
children and to avoid poverty. All things considered, childhood would constitute a 
“good investment” for the future through implementation of a dual strategy of 
prevention, aiming on the one hand at raising household incomes through the granting 
of family allowances and, on the other, at promoting female employment and double-
income families through the development of childcare services.  
Another official report, published in February 2007 by the Centre d’analyse 
stratégique, at the demand of the Prime minister Dominique de Villepin, to analyse the 
opportunity to develop a “service public de la petite enfance”, uses explicitly this 
“social investment” rhetoric. 
“A lot of inquiries show that inequalities between children are already important when 
they begin preschools and that they are not going to reduce afterwards. By offering a 
good childcare service from the beginning, one can promote equality of chances… By 
facilitating the access to work for women, one can reduce poverty and give better 
opportunities to all children. It is clear that there are many individual and collective 
benefits linked to an important social investment in childhood.  
Alors que l’Etat-providence est appelé à se tourner de plus en plus vers 
l’investissement social plutôt que vers la difficile réparation des situations d’inégalités, 
l’idée d’investir fortement dans le domaine de la petite enfance progresse partout dans 
le monde. Il apparaît de la sorte nécessaire en France de continuer à promouvoir une 
politique efficace et ambitieuse dans ce secteur ». (Centre d’analyse stratégique, 
Rapport sur le service public à la petite enfance. Février 2007, p. 6).  
The “social investment strategy” is directly connected with the policies of social 
activation, which objective is to integrate the entire population into the labour market 
(Giddens, 1998). These strategies represent new priorities and measures for the 
restructuring of welfare regimes. In that perspective, women and children are 
considered on the basis of their maximum productivity potential: thus, women have to 
be included in the labour market and must be supported with high level childcare 
services. “By the de-familialization of women, an increased number of employed 
                                                 
7
 . “Since the possibilities of employment and a professional career depend to an ever greater extent on 
the individual’s acquisition of learning skills, this must be taken as the starting point. The mobilisation 
and adaptation of the adult is realistic and profitable provided he or she is already in possession of a 
minimum of learning capacity… Policies that aim at guaranteeing a second chance are far more costly 
and far less efficient than those that aim at improving the well-being of the very young.” (Esping-
Andersen, 2002, pp. 49 et 55) (see also Jenson, 2000) 
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women as well as a higher birth rate and prevention of poverty in households with 
children will be achieved” (Olk, 2006). Nevertheless, this economic rationality doesn’t 
mean that the main objective may be full individual citizenship (Lewis, 2006). As Olk 
suggests: “The central goal is not the strengthening of the power position of women vis-
à-vis men, but women are important because of their economic potentiality, which can 
be activated by an intensified participation in the labour market. And with regard to 
children, it is not the creation of a ‘good childhood’ in the here and now, but rather 
mobilizing children as productive workers of the future. It is not the citizenship rights of 
women and children which are at the centre but the role of women and children as 
investment goods in a social investment regime…The child is not ‘being a citizen’, but 
rather a ‘citizen-in-becoming’. And the citizen status is reduced to the economic 
dimension of the productive citizen-worker-of-the-future, and weakens the political and 
social dimension of full citizenship.” (idem). 
The development of this new welfare architecture, with the objective of enhancing the 
participation of both parents to the labour market, may lead to the obligation of these 
workers to accept any employment, even if it implies a deterioration of their living 
conditions and a decrease of the time spent with the children.  
This difficulty explains why all the reports have a development about the necessity to 
help parents, and mainly mothers, to cope with their flexible and precarious working 
conditions
8
. The question of atypical working time is treated as a problem in both 
reports of the CAS (2005 and 2007)
9
.  
Nevertheless, despite these converging arguments to defend the creation of a public 
service of childcare, the last CAS report doesn’t fulfil this proposition. It limits itself to 
suggest a unique “guichet” to accede to services, because of the complexity of the offer 
on a local basis.  
If we look at the Presidential campaign and the candidates’ propositions, Ségolène 
Royal is the only one who engages herself to create such a “right” to a childcare 
solution for any citizen in the perspective of a real “public service of childcare”.  
“Je crois possible et nécessaire de créer, notamment, un véritable service public de la 
petite enfance qui soulage les mères, allège la tâche des familles monoparentales et celle 
des femmes salariées, majoritairement abonnées aux petits salaires et aux contrats 
précaires (Discours de Rodez, 12 mai 2006). « le service public de la petite enfance sera 
créé. Il devra garantir à tous les parents le droit effectif à l’accueil et à la garde de leurs 
                                                 
8
 . The development of atypical times of work is one of the challenges that parents are facing at the 
moment (for a development, see Le Bihan and Martin, 2005). 
9
 . See pages 99-100 in CAS (2005) and pages 22-23 in CAS (2007) 
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enfants de 2 mois à 3 ans. Je pense aux femmes peu qualifiées que le complément 
d’activité de libre choix incite à se retirer du marché du travail et qui une fois de retour, 
retrouvent des conditions d’emploi plus précaires qu’avant. » ( ‘La France qui se bat, la 
France qui se relève. Discours de Strasbourg, 20 décembre 2006). Sur 
www.desirsdavenir.org ) 
« Pour réaliser l’égalité, il faut à la fois agir sur les représentations, faire évoluer les 
mentalités et les habitudes. C’est une question culturelle, symbolique et sociale… 
Elever des enfants et mener une carrière, c’est négocier en permanence avec sa 
culpabilité. C’est pourquoi j’ai mis au premier rang de mes propositions la création d’un 
service public de la petite enfance : la certitude d’un mode de garde dès la fin du congé 
de maternité est indispensable. Et puis, il faut aussi que cela bouge dans les familles et 
les couples ! Même si on apprécie les évolutions chez les jeunes parents, le partage des 
responsabilités domestiques et familiales n’est toujours pas équitable, … ce sont 
toujours les femmes qui interrompent leur vie professionnelle ou la mettent en veilleuse 
pour se consacrer davantage aux enfants. J’ai créé le congé de paternité quand j’avais en 
charge le ministère de la famille, justement pour permettre aux pères de s’impliquer 
davantage. Je suis fière de cette mesure. Ce congé pour les pères était aussi une belle 
avancée pour les femmes. Mais il faut continuer, aller plus loin dans le partage et le 
soutien aux parents. Je n’accepte pas que pour les femmes, enfants et autonomie entrent 
en contradiction. » (« Le respect des femmes, c’est le condition de l’égalité », interview 
de Ségolène Royal dans L’hebdo des socialistes, n°438, samedi 3 mars 2007p. 9-10). 
François Bayrou, (UDF central party’s candidate), only enumerates measures like :  
« Le développement de crèches d’entreprise, ainsi que de crèches collectives et 
familiales à horaires adaptés, l’organisation d’études surveillés pour les collégiens. Je 
propose de fractionner le congé parental pour que les parents puissent consacrer du 
temps à leurs enfants à tout moment de sa scolarité, jusqu’à 16 ans » 
(www.Bayrou.fr/propositions/enfance.html ).  
On the Nicolas Sarkozy’s site, it is impossible to find any specific section to this type 
of issues, even if, on the contrary you can buy Tshirts and caps with the candidate’s 
name and photography. His position on family issue and WFB are presented by his 
“porte-parole”, Valérie Pécresse. 
“Nous voulons permettre à tous les français d’avoir le nombre d’enfants qu’ils 
souhaitent. Cela nous conduit à proposer l’instauration d’un droit de l’enfant à être 
gardé qui serait opposable d’ici 2012. C’est-à-dire que d’ici la fin de la législature, nous 
nous engageons à proposer à chaque famille une solution de garde adaptée pour ses 
enfants, sachant que cette solution pourra être une crèche, mais aussi une crèche 
d’entreprise, un jardin d’enfants ou une assistante maternelle. Nous voulons ensuite 
aider les français dans leur tâche  d’éducation et pour cela, nous proposons de 
généraliser les études dirigées, dans les collèges et les lycées, pour tous les enfants, afin 
de mettre fin à cette injustice criante qui est celle du soutien scolaire accessible 
uniquement aux plus riches. Nous voulons que dans la mission de l’éducation nationale 
il y ait cette mission de soutien scolaire. Cela permet aux parents de rentrer du travail en 
sachant que leurs enfants n’ont pas été livrés à eux-mêmes et qu’ils rentrent devoirs 
faits. Enfin, nous voulons favoriser les solidarités familiales par rapport à des solidarités 
plus socialisées qui sont plus impersonnelles et dans lesquelles l’affection a moins de 
place. » (http://abonnes.lemonde.fr ) 05.02.07 
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